I. Introduction

Election law has a tremendous influence on nearly every issue in the United States. Free and fair elections imply that everyone receives an equal vote, and therefore citizens should have their voices represented proportionally in local, state, and federal legislatures. This, however, is not what happens in practice, as voting rights have been regressing rapidly since the landmark court case Shaw v. Reno. While one person equals one vote in theory, the question becomes what is the definition of a person? Where is the line where one can legitimately deny the fundamental right to vote? The answers to these questions are not as straightforward. While voting equity took a sharp downward with Shaw, one of the most regressive court decisions regarding voting rights was just recently decided. Rucho v. Common Cause set a new precedent declaring partisan gerrymandering as justiciable. Given the recency of the case, its effects and possible solutions are not yet definite. This paper explores the aftermath of a few key voting rights cases in North Carolina– one of the most prominent gerrymandered states. It discusses and assesses the potential looming effects and racial implications of Rucho for North Carolina and the United States as a whole.

North Carolina has often been center stage in the debates surrounding issues of electoral integrity and potential discrimination.[1] Landmark election law cases, such as Thornburg v. Gingles,[2] Shaw v. Reno,[3] and Rucho v. Common Cause[4] have raised concerns regarding voter discrimination. Allegations of the state trampling on citizen’s fundamental rights has placed a spotlight on North Carolina. If there is evidence of potential voter discrimination, how could that discrimination operate within North Carolina’s current political processes?

II. North Carolina Redistricting Background

North Carolina has generally leaned Republican on a national level, though a closer look at more localized elections reveals a more complex history of voting behavior.[5] In 2016 and 2020, North Carolina voted for Republican candidate Donald Trump, who subsequently received North Carolina’s electoral votes both times.[6] In the 2018 Congressional elections, about half of those in North Carolina voted for Republicans, with about 48% voting for Democratic candidates.[7] If congressional elections were similar to Federal election voting trends, a race involving 13 Congressional candidates would split about evenly—likely with a few more Republicans winning their races. Instead, Republicans won 10 seats and Democrats won just three.[8]

This difference can be explained by how congressional elections operate. Congressional seats are allocated based on census data taken every 10 years, with the number of electoral votes reflecting district populations.[9] However, how districts are drawn within states is generally left to the State governments.[10] These redistricting powers are often given to those currently in power in their states, which has historically raised concerns.[11] Terms like gerrymandering, which describes redistricting with the intent of influencing future elections, have been levied by those critical of certain redistricting processes.[12]

Elections in a pre-Shelby world versus a post-Shelby world demonstrate the impact of gerrymandering. In 2004, Democrats won seven out of thirteen (54%) seats in the House of Representatives that matched proportionately to the popular vote for the Democratic governor who won 56%of the vote.[13] While Republican George H.W. Bush still won the presidential election with 56% of the vote, there were very few discrepancies between the partisan makeup of voters in North Carolina versus the outcome of the election.[14] The same thing happened in 2008 when Democrats won eight of thirteen (62%) seats in the House, the gubernatorial election with 50.2% of the vote, and the presidential election with 49.9% of the vote.[15] The discrepancies between actual partisan makeup, based on the popular vote, and election results were minor. This reveals that the less restrictive electoral policies in effect— due to North Carolina being subject to the VRA Section 5 scrutiny— helped promote a reflective government. The 2012 election was slightly different because, while the state flipped from blue to red, there was less consistency between the popular vote for the governor and the district votes for the House.[16] Republicans held nine of thirteen (69%) House seats and won the gubernatorial race with 54.7% of the vote.[17] This discrepancy happened just as the VRA began to lose steam, just before the passing of Shelby. This is contrasted by the extreme dissimilarity between population makeup and election results from 2016— after the VRA lost enforceability due to the Shelby decision.[18] Republicans controlled ten of thirteen (77%) of North Carolina’s seats in the United States House of Representatives.[19] This is severely contrasted by the popular gubernatorial vote where Democrats won with 49% of the vote, while the Republican candidate had 48.8%.[20] Only 48.8% of voters voted Republican for governor, and yet Republicans controlled nearly 77% of the House seats.

Major progressive strides were taken between the 1960s and 1990s when the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA) [21] was in full throttle, with major strides taken in North Carolina. This is attributable to the forty of North Carolina’s 100 counties—including N.C.’s third most popular city in Guilford County[22]—that qualify under the VRA’s Section 4 formula by which districts and states would be subject to Section 5 preclearance.[23] This means that any change in those counties’ voting policies would be subject to approval by either the D.C. district court or the Attorney General. So, North Carolina’s voting laws were relatively equitable, or at least not regressive, following the passing of the VRA. North Carolina’s progression was reaffirmed by Thornburg v. Gingles.[24] This case struck down a restrictive N.C. voting law due to its discriminatory effect, proving that it was difficult to for North Carolina to enact restrictive laws while the VRA was fully functional.

This progress was reversed in 2013 when Shelby County v. Holder[25] weakened the VRA. The majority opinion declared Section 4(b) of the Voting Rights Act unconstitutional, so the “formula in that section can no longer be used as a basis for subjecting jurisdictions to preclearance.”[26] This made Section 5 obsolete, as there were no longer districts that qualify for preclearance. The VRA essentially became non-enforceable. Shelby v. Holder was detrimental to equitable voting rights in North Carolina, as countless restrictive voting policies came into place directly following the decision’s release.

Just three months after Shelby, the North Carolina Voter Information Verification Act (VIVA) passed.[27] This act included restrictions like the shortening of the seventeen-day early voting period to seven days, disallowing pre-registration for sixteen and seventeen-year-olds, eliminating same-day voter registration, and requiring a voter ID. While these laws operated under the justification of strengthening the integrity of North Carolina’s electoral system, many policies had disparate impacts on minority voters—most notably Black voters. This is significant because 22.3% of the North Carolina population is Black, so disparate laws have tremendous effects on election outcomes.[28] The disparate impact is corroborated by a study by the Florida State Law Review that analyzes when, where, and how Black citizens vote in North Carolina.[29] The study found that “[B]lack early voters in North Carolina tend to vote earlier in the allotted period than [W]hite early voters.”[30] Therefore, shortening the early voting period by seven days will likely have a disproportionately larger impact on Black voters because they primarily vote in the former half of the early voting period. VIVA is also less lenient for young black people since “sixteen and seventeen year-old preregistration was used prior to VIVA disproportionately by [B]lacks.”[31] The same study concludes that “[B]lack registered voters were disproportionately represented among registered voters with neither driver's licenses nor non-operator identifications.”[32] Even though there is an exception that voters over seventy years old do not have to show an ID, there is a “greater proportion of [W]hite registered voters who are seventy years of age and older compared to [B]lack registered voters.”[33] VIVA’s ID policy frequently impacts Black voters more than White voters, and the elderly exception only exacerbates this disparity.[34]

Many other restrictions were put in place following Shelby, including eliminating straight-ticket voting, disallowing extending polling hours in extraordinary circumstances, throwing away any ballot cast at the wrong polling station, and requiring ID numbers for absentee ballots.[35] Even though these laws may have disparate impacts as demonstrated through VIVA, each restrictive law was upheld when a “federal judge ruled . . . against a petition . . . to block North Carolina’s expansive voting law from taking effect,” because none of the measures demonstrated “irreparable harm.”[36] Even today, the legislature is attempting to enact voter signature verification for absentee ballots.[37]

Ultimately, the aftermath of Shelby v. Holder set up a norm in which new voting policies restrict voting rights as far as they possibly can without explicit racial discrimination.[38] A gerrymandered redistricting map was implemented in 2011.[39] This was most prominent in districts one and twelve, as they were extremely oddly shaped.[40] Ultimately, these maps were deemed unconstitutional in Cooper v. Harris[41] because, as the District Court explained, “the General Assembly did not narrowly tailor the districts to serve a compelling interest” and “the defendants have failed to establish that its race-based redistricting satisfies strict scrutiny.”[42]

Even though North Carolina had an apparent improvement from 2012, the 2016 gerrymandered map made it all the way to the US Supreme Court in the case of Rucho v. Common Cause.[43] Rucho held that, according to the dissent, “the adjudication of partisan gerrymandering claims is beyond judicial capabilities.”[44] This case requires states to hold themselves accountable when partisan gerrymandering.

Rucho opens up the door for even more regressive voting policies in North Carolina, going beyond the allowances of Shelby. This time, post-Rucho regression in North Carolina was done through partisan gerrymandering that drowned out Democrats’ voices. This contrasts with the post- Shelby policies that limited people from physically voting. This becomes clear because Rucho upheld North Carolina’s 2016 districts, even though the districts facilitated a Republican win for “ten of North Carolina's thirteen congressional seats, despite only receiving 53% of the statewide vote.”[45] The courts upheld the maps and said partisan gerrymandering is no longer a justiciable question.

Ultimately, voting rights and fair redistricting policies in North Carolina have been rapidly deteriorating in the post-Shaw world, most notably due to the aftermaths of Shelby and Rucho. The regression helped Republicans hold onto their disproportionate amount of representation and has looming effects on federal policy. In the aftermath of Rucho, it became significantly more difficult to prove that partisan gerrymandering violates state constitutions. In the Fordham Law Review, United States District Court law clerk Kevin Wender emphasizes that now “courts may only strike down the most extremely gerrymandered maps.”[46] This is problematic because, as Wender explains, “[e]ntrenching partisan power through partisan gerrymandering corrodes democracy by decreasing competitive elections, permitting the election of representatives that are unrepresentative of the electorate, and diluting the franchise of a large number of voters solely because of their party affiliation.”[47] Now, in the post-Rucho scene, maps need to undeniably, viciously discriminate in order for the courts to strike them down.[48]

Professor Jeanne Clelland compares the 2016 maps to a model map created by a bipartisan judge panel. Even though the new 2016 maps may look less gerrymandered due to their compactness, “Democratic voters were ‘cracked’ and ‘packed’ in both the 2012 and 2016 plans, giving Republicans an advantage.”[49] Republican legislators redrew the map in 2016 to “maintain their hold on 10 of the state’s 13 Congressional seats,” but did so without the telltale shapes used in 2012.[50] This proves that legislators will restrict voters as far as possible with the hope of not getting caught. In cases such as 2012, they simply move the discriminatory line slightly back. Clelland emphasizes that appearing equitable but remaining discriminatory is even more accessible for states, because now, “computational methods and the widespread availability of relevant data have made it easier to generate nice looking plans that still return extremely skewed partisan results, as demonstrated by recent examples in North Carolina.”[51] The progression of the 2012 to 2016 maps was strategic so that North Carolina could maintain the appearance of improvement in voter equity when in reality trying to gerrymander without getting caught.

Even if an egregious map is struck down, the state can still replace it with a slightly less gerrymandered map. This can be a cycle that lasts until extreme gerrymandering can no longer be proven, even if it exists. This idea is exemplified in Common Cause v. Lewis,[52] the first partisan gerrymandering trial under the North Carolina State Constitution following the Rucho decision. This case successfully challenges North Carolina’s 2017 districts on partisan gerrymandering claims.[53] This case was likely only successful due to the release of the Hoffeler files. The Hofeller files are a series of documents containing information about the way in which districts were organized in North Carolina. The documents were the property of the late Thomas Hofeller, who was also known as “the master of the modern gerrymander.”[54] When Hofeller passed away in 2018, his private files were given to the public, and their contents were revealing. They explicitly organized districts based on partisan grounds and demographics of people likely to be Republicans or Democrats. One of the spreadsheets organized the districts based on the percentage of eligible African American voters. Many methods like this were used to organize the districts, clearly and explicitly revealing the extent of the gerrymandering.

Hofeller drew the districts well before the legislature was supposed to draw them publicly, but yet the states’ official districts were still almost identical to Hofeller’s discriminatory districts. This is problematic because the Rucho decision addresses that Article I, Section 4, Clause 1 of the Constitution “assigns to state legislatures the power to prescribe the ‘Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections.’”[55] The legislature did not draw the gerrymandered districts, and the electorate did not give consent for another entity to draw the districts, making the map unlawful on yet another level. The issue arises because the U.S. Supreme Court’s reasoning for no longer checking partisan gerrymandering claims rests partly on the grounds that state legislatures are the ones who are supposed to be drawing the districts. This is not what was playing out in North Carolina, because they were being drawn by non-elected political entities like Thomas Hofeller.

It is difficult to prove that the manner in which the district was drawn was premature and intentionally unfair. It was only made explicit in this case due to an exceptional circumstance. The Hofeller files were essentially released out of luck, and the chances of valuable files like those being released again are slim. Proving partisan gerrymandering is more difficult without explicit evidence, so new discriminatory maps are less likely to be struck down. When the map districts were struck down in Common Cause v. Lewis, “the state's Republican-led legislature created new legislative districts that were only slightly less gerrymandered.”[56] This is because, even though they got caught in 2019, they simply moved the discriminatory line back a hair, because they believed that they could get away with gerrymandering again.

Each of these issues becomes even more complicated when the line between racial and partisan gerrymandering is blurred. One journal article explains that when North Carolina district maps were “overpacking Black voters into a few districts,” Republicans defended it as “legitimate partisan efforts to dampen Democratic voting strength statewide.”[57] This means that, to some extent, political gerrymandering can cover up and justify racial gerrymandering. Race can be a prominent indicator of someone’s party affiliation, and many minority groups tend to lean Democrat while White people tend to lean Republican.[58] The Pew Research Center conducted a survey that concludes that “Republicans hold a 49%-40% lead over the Democrats in leaned party identification among [W]hites. . . . The Democrats hold an 80%-11% advantage among Blacks, lead by close to three-to-one among among Asian Americans (65%-23%) and by more than two-to-one among Hispanics (56%-26%).”[59] Now that partisan gerrymandering is not a justiciable question post-Rucho, it may become easier for states like North Carolina to racially gerrymander on partisan grounds.

One would think that this discrepancy would be exacerbated due to Rucho, except that is not what the 2020 election demonstrates. While there were still severe discrepancies between the popular vote and the house elections, the Democrats gained two seats in the House to have five of thirteen (38%), and the Democrat governor won with 51.5% of the vote.[60] This discrepancy is clearly still apparent, but the Rucho decision did not exacerbate it.

This may be due to Common Cause v. Lewis[61] and the release of the Hofeller files that forced North Carolina to make their districts slightly less gerrymandered.[62] The 2020 maps improved slightly from the struck-down 2016 gerrymandered maps, because Republicans pulled the discriminatory line back a hair. Ultimately, there is no way to know what will happen next, but it is possible that there will be more regression as the Republicans continue to push the gerrymandering line until they are caught again. Because of the closed nature of the federal legislature, extra seats for the Republican party have a tremendous impact on policy passed in the U.S. as a whole.[63] For example, the House in 2020 had a barely Democratic majority with 222 Democrats and 213 Republicans.[64] This close nature means any discrepancies have an amplifying effect. If those extra seats went to North Carolinian Democrats, the House and their policies may have looked very different.

III. Potential Solutions

It is useful to discuss some of the possible solutions and their pros and cons. Political scientist Kevin Wender offers three primary methods through which gerrymandering post-Rucho can be mitigated: state courts, independent redistricting commissions (IRCs), and congressional legislation.[65] Wender first offers the state courts as a route to reverse post-Rucho regression. He says that North Carolina— and a few other states— “have had some limited success in striking down gerrymandered maps in state courts . . . as violating their respective state's constitutions.”[66] Wender is most likely referring to Common Cause v. Lewis,[67] which struck down district maps on partisan gerrymandering grounds, proving that it is still possible to mitigate partisan gerrymandering despite states holding themselves accountable. However, a prominent reason that the districts were overturned was due to the Hofeller files being released— an unlikely event that explicitly proved the gerrymander. Without the extenuating circumstances of Hofeller’s death and the release of his files, it is unknown what the outcome of the case would have been. Thus, the courts may not be a reliable strategy to consistently deter partisan gerrymandering, as it is hard to prove, and only pushes the legislature to draw slightly less gerrymandered districts. The slightly more proportional results of the 2020 election in North Carolina following Common Cause v. Lewis demonstrates that this approach is more effective than nothing.[68]

The next solution Wender offers to reverse voting rights regression is by giving redistricting power to independent redistricting commissions (IRCs) that “attempt to curb partisan gerrymandering by insulating the redistricting process from the political branches.”[69] The Supreme Court even upheld these commissions, saying that the “the [Elections] Clause surely was not adopted to diminish a State’s authority to determine its own lawmaking processes” in Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission.[70] The issue comes because many states do not have a referendum and initiative process where voters can implement IRCs. Beyond this, the constitutionality of IRCs could be questioned again in light of the increasingly conservative US Supreme Court.

Given the uncertain nature of the previous possible solutions, Wender offers congressional legislation as an option to help mitigate voting rights regression. He explains that the Elections Clause of the Constitution gives “Congress the ultimate authority to regulate federal elections,” in order to “prevent the states from unfairly manipulating the electoral process through practices like extreme partisan gerrymandering.”[71] This power of Congress can be exemplified through the passing of the VRA which altered the power of states in elections and led to more equitable elections. This solution seems promising because Shelby County v. Holder[72] left the door open for Congress to create another updated version of the Section 4 formula, in turn making the VRA enforceable again, assuming political polarization would not be an issue to reach a vote.[73]

Beyond this, gerrymandering benefits one party or another, so the party that benefits is unlikely to pass a law against gerrymandering. For example, the Republican majority in North Carolina is unlikely to pass a law against partisan gerrymandering, because it gives them tremendous political power, and without a law, they cannot stay in power. This circular progression of gerrymandering keeps the majority in power, ultimately making it unlikely to cease. Also, Republicans will be further deterred from compromising because physical voting restrictions tend to give them more political power. Furthermore, even though the Department of Justice has already asked federal courts to place North Carolina back under preclearance, “the likelihood that it would allow the judicial branch to intervene to place jurisdictions back under Section 5 preclearance is unlikely.”[74] Thus, these policies are not going away any time soon, and the pre- Shaw progressive era has come to an end.

IV. Conclusion

Ultimately, Shelby v. Holder and Rucho v. Common Cause led to significant regression in regard to voting policies in North Carolina, where the former incited policies to limit physical voting, and the latter provoked gerrymandering to drown out Democrats’ voices in elections. All of the policies have significantly enhanced Republicans’ wins in federal elections causing an echoing effect of policy around the country. While there are possible solutions looming, the likelihood of this voter suppression ceasing any time soon is unlikely due to increased partisan polarization and an increasingly conservative makeup of the Supreme Court. Only time will tell if voting rights in America will continue to regress, or if a possible solution will pick up ground to effectively recreate the progress of the 1960s. For now, one can only wait and see.

[1] Nick Corasaniti, As 2024 Voting Battles Heat Up, North Carolina G.O.P. Presses Forward, N.Y. Times (July 2, 2023), https://www.nytimes.com/2023/07/02/us/politics/north-carolina-voting-rights.html.

[2] 478 U.S. 30 (1986).

[3] 509 U.S. 630 (1993).

[4] 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019).

[5] North Carolina Presidential Election Voting History, 270 To Win, https://www.270towin.com/states/North_Carolina (last visited June 6, 2024).

[6] Id.

[7] Id.

[8] Id.

[9] State-by-state Redistricting Procedures, Ballotpedia, https://ballotpedia.org /State-by-state_redistricting_procedures (last visited Feb. 28, 2024).

[10] Id.

[11] Id.

[12] Id.

[13] North Carolina Election Results 2004, CNN, https://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2004/pages/results/states/NC/ (last visited June 6, 2024).

[14] Id.

[15] Fernanda Santos, North Carolina - Election Results 2008, N.Y. Times (Dec. 9, 2008),

https://www.nytimes.com/elections/2008/results/states/north-carolina.html.

[16] Stephanie Strom, North Carolina - Election 2012, N.Y. Times,

https://www.nytimes.com/elections/2012/results/states/north-carolina.html (last visited June 6, 2024).

[17] Id.

[18] North Carolina Election Results 2016, N.Y. Times (Aug. 1, 2017, 11:22 AM), https://www.nytimes.com/elections/2016/results/north-carolina.

[19] Id.

[20] Id.

[21] Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965).

[22] North Carolina Counties by Population, N.C. Demographics, https://www.northcarolina-demographics.com/counties_by_population (last visited June 6, 2024).

[23] Jurisdictions Previously Covered by Section 5, Civ. Rts. Div. U.S. Dep’t of Just.,  https://www.justice.gov/crt/jurisdictions-previously-covered-section-5 (May 17, 2023).

[24] 478 U.S. 30, 34 (1986).

[25] 570 U.S. 529, 532 (2013).

[26] Id.

[27] North Carolina Voter Information Verification Act, 381, N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 163-166.13 (2013); Murray Warren & Samuelson Moore, Bill Summary for H 589 (2013-2014), UNC Sch. of Gov’t (Jul. 24, 2013), https://lrs.sog.unc.edu/billsum/h-589-2013-2014-8.

[28] America Counts Staff, North Carolina: 2020 Census, U.S. Census Bureau (Aug. 25, 2021), https://www.census.gov/library/stories/state-by-state/north-carolina-population-change-between-census-decade.html.

[29] Michael C. Herron & Daniel A. Smith, Race, Shelby County, and the Voter Information Verification Act in North Carolina, 43 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 465 (2017).

[30] Id. at 489.

[31] Id. at 506.

[32] Id. at 497.

[33] Id. at 503.

[34] Id. at 500-02.

[35] Maya Rhodan, Federal Judge Allows North Carolina Voting Law for Midterms, TIME (Aug. 11, 2014 12:45 PM), https://time.com/3100886/voting-rights-north-carolina-ruling/.

[36] Id.

[37] See Lynn Bonner, State Elections Board Rejects NC GOP Signature Matching Request for Absentee Ballots, NC Newsline (Jul. 15, 2022, 6:00 AM),

https://ncnewsline.com/2022/07/15/state-elections-board-rejects-nc-gop-signature-matching-request-for-absentee-ballots/.

[38] Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 532 (2013).

[39] Harris v. McCrory, 159 F. Supp. 3d 600, 604 (2016).

[40] Id.

[41] 581 U.S. 285, 291 (2017).

[42] McCrory, 159 F. Supp. 3d at 604.

[43] 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2487 (2019).

[44] Id. at 2515 (Kagan, J., dissenting).

[45] Kevin Wender, Note, The “Whip Hand”: Congress's Elections Clause Power as the Last Hope for Redistricting Reform After Rucho, 88 Fordham L. Rev.2085, 2094 (2020).

[46] Id. at 2097.

[47] Id. at 2107.

[48] Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2487.

[49] Jeanne Clelland, Daryl DeFord, & Moon Muchin, Aftermath: The Ensemble Approach to Political Redistricting, Math Horizons, Feb. 2020, at 34, 35.

[50] Id.

[51] Id.

[52] 956 F.3d 246 (4th Cir. 2020).

[53] Id. at 249.

[54] David Daley, The Secret Files of the Master of Modern Republican Gerrymandering, The New Yorker (Sept. 6, 2019),

https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-secret-files-of-the-master-of-modern-republican-gerrymandering.

[55] Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2495 (2019).

[56] Wender, supra note 48, at 2096.

[57] Sara Tofighbakhsh, Note, Racial Gerrymandering After Rucho v. Common Cause: Untangling Race and Party, 120 Columbia L. Rev.1885, 1909 (2020).

[58] Id.

[59] A Deep Dive into Party Affiliation, Pew Rsch. Ctr. (Apr. 7, 2015), https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2015/04/07/a-deep-dive-into-party-affiliation/.

[60] North Carolina 2020 Election Results, CNN (2020),

https://www.cnn.com/election/2020/results/state/north-carolina.

[61] Common Cause v. Lewis, 956 F.3d 246, 248 (4th Cir. 2020).

[62] David Daley, The Secret Files of the Master of Modern Republican Gerrymandering, The New Yorker (Sept. 6, 2019),

https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-secret-files-of-the-master-of-modern-republican-gerrymandering.

[63] House Results, CNN Politics (2020), https://www.cnn.com/election/2020/results/house.

[64] Id.

[65] Wender, supra note 48, at 2096-2106.

[66] Id. at 2096.

[67] 956 F.3d 246 (4th Cir. 2020).

[68] Id.

[69] Wender, supra note 48, at 2097.

[70] 576 U.S. 787, 824 (2015).

[71] Wender, supra note 48, at 2108.

[72] 570 U.S. 529 (2013).

[73] Id. at 532.

[74] Vincent Marinaccio, Note, Protecting Voters’ Rights: The Aftermath of Shelby v. Holder, 35 Whittier L. Rev. 531, 554 (2014).